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RETHINKING  THE  EFFICIENCY
OF THE COMMON LAW
D. Daniel Sokol*
This Article shows how Posner and other scholars who claimed that common law was effi-
cient misunderstood the structure of common law.  If common law was more efficient, there would
have been a noticeable push across most, if not all, doctrines to greater efficiency.  This has not
been the case.  Rather, common law, better recast as a “platform,” could, under a certain set of
parameters, lead to efficient outcomes.  Next, the Article’s analysis suggests that while not every
judge thinks about efficiency in decisionmaking, there must be some architectural or governance
feature pushing in the direction of efficiency—which exists in some areas of law and not in
others.  This Article explains two-sided markets, or platforms, generally and applies the modular
open-source platform model to judge made law.  In doing so, it explores concepts that impact the
efficiency of such platforms—platform governance, modularity, and fragmentation.  Then, this
Article applies the understanding of platforms to several areas of law that might be understood as
more prone to economic analysis because the issues addressed in law tend to be more “economic,”
such as torts, bankruptcy, patents, and corporations.  In these areas, no combination of platform
architecture and modularity has allowed for the development of more efficient legal rules as a
general matter.  Finally, this Article studies antitrust law as the one area of law that suggests
that the efficiency of common law is possible and the causal mechanism of necessary conditions
that needs to be met.  Antitrust law is different than other areas of law because of a singular goal,
an architectural governance based on a single federal court (the Supreme Court) with few sub-
stantive legislative changes for the past one hundred years, which provides for coherent govern-
ance of the platform.  This Article concludes by discussing the implications of an efficient
platform design for other areas of law.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental research question in law has been to explain how caselaw
develops.  Perhaps the most famous formulation of how law works in practice
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in the past half century is Judge Richard Posner’s idea on the efficiency of
common law.  He suggests that the common law, for which he meant judge-
made law,1 can reach economically efficient outcomes.2  At its core, Posner’s
argument was that common-law judicial decisionmaking enjoys a comparative
institutional advantage over statutory law because of the evolutionary nature
of common law through adjudication and precedent.3  This common-law
process in turn leads to more “efficient”4 outcomes as good precedents over-
rule bad precedents.5  This idea is powerful, so much so that Posner is yearly
on the shortlist for potential Nobel Prize recipients for economics.6
Since the time of the publication of Posner’s work on the efficiency of
common law, there have been numerous extensions of his idea.7  Some
extensions suggest that the efficiency of common law is a function of litigants
looking to reshape legal doctrine.8  In economic terms, this is a “demand-
1 Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,
103 n.1 (1979).  Posner’s common-law view can be contrasted to a different, noneconomic
view of judge-made law. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
466–67 (1897); see also John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 653, 665–69 (2012) (providing an overview of the literature).
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98–99 (1972) (“In searching for a
reasonably objective and impartial standard, as the traditions of the bench require him to
do, the judge can hardly fail to consider whether the loss was the product of wasteful,
uneconomical resource use.  In a culture of scarcity, this is an urgent, an inescapable ques-
tion.  And at least an approximation to the answer is in most cases reasonably accessible to
intuition and common sense.”).
3 Initially, Posner also assumed that judges were motivated by efficiency, at least
implicitly, in their decisionmaking. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maxi-
mize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39–40 (1993) (“[T]he
common law and other areas of judge-made law are on the whole efficiency-enhancing.”);
Posner, supra note 1, at 103.  More recently, Posner and his coauthors have a more
nuanced understanding of multiple motivations of judicial behavior. See LEE EPSTEIN, WIL-
LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 5 (2013).
4 Posner meant allocative efficiency. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 98–99, 223–30, 329.
This Article uses Posner’s allocative-efficiency framework even though there are other
types of efficiency.  For some limitations on efficiency, see Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H.
McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1052–53
(2016).
5 While initially Posner presented the efficiency of common law as a positive descrip-
tion, he later embraced the idea of efficiency of the common law as a normative claim. See
Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudi-
cation, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1980) (shifting the focus “from normative to positive”);
Posner, supra note 1, at 103.
6 See, e.g., Ben Leubsdorf, Who Will Win the 2017 Nobel Prize in Economics?, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 3, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2017/10/03/who-will-win-the-2017-
nobel-prize-in-economics/.
7 This Article notes that efficiency may not always be the optimal normative goal of
the system or may not always be one that fully explains how the law works.
8 See Martin J. Bailey & Paul H. Rubin, A Positive Theory of Legal Change, 14 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 467, 468 (1994); George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 421 (1980); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977) [hereinafter Priest, The Common Law Process]; Paul H.
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side” response.  Others argue that the efficiency is a function of “supply-side”
factors such as institutional factors.9  Critiques to the efficiency of common-
law hypothesis also have been significant, such as: the motivations of
judges,10 variation over particular common-law or statutory regimes,11 selec-
tion effects in decided cases as opposed to settled cases,12 or that the legisla-
ture13 or courts14 may respond to judicial overreach.
As a positive matter, common law generally is not more efficient today
than Posner’s observation forty-five years ago.  The lack of a general shift
across areas of law to more efficient outcomes is perhaps more surprising
given greater economic analysis in law school curricula,15 scholarship,16 and
judicial training in economics.17  Posner’s most famous insight seems to have
been wrong.
This Article makes two contributions.  First, it reframes the efficiency-of-
common-law thesis by making an original point as to how prior thinkers mis-
understood the structure of law and how law could, under a certain set of
parameters, lead to efficient outcomes.18  It shows how Posner and other
Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206 (1982); Paul H. Rubin,
Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977).
9 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-
Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1552–53 (2003).
10 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 147 (2006); Harry T.
Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the
Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1899 (2009); Pauline T. Kim,
Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel
Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2009); David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1791, 1795–96 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)).
11 See, e.g., Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, supra note 8, at 212–13.
12 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583,
612–14 (1992); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 974 (1979); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1984). But see Daniel Klerman
& Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 209–10 (2014).
13 See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Politi-
cal Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 244–46 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure
and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,
75 VA. L. REV. 431, 445 (1989).
14 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1818–19 (2007).
15 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 166–67 (6th prtg. 2001) (1993) (“Law
and economics is today a permanent, institutionalized feature of American legal educa-
tion. . . . The law-and-economics movement has transformed the way that teachers . . .
think about their subject and present it to their students. . . . This is the single most impor-
tant change in American legal education in the last twenty-five years . . . .”).
16 See, e.g., AM. L. & ECON. ASS’N, http://www.amlecon.org/ (last visited Sept. 23,
2019).
17 See generally, e.g., Elliott Ash et al., Ideas Have Consequences: The Impact of Law
and Economics on American Justice 1–5 (Mar. 20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), http:/
/elliottash.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ash-chen-naidu-2019-03-20.pdf.
18 See discussion infra Part I.
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scholars who claimed that common law was efficient misunderstood the
structure of common law.  If common law was more efficient, there would
have been a noticeable push across most, if not all, doctrines to greater effi-
ciency.  This has not been the case.  Rather, common law, better understood
as a platform, could, under a certain set of parameters, lead to efficient out-
comes.19  Second, this Article’s analysis suggests an institutional design con-
tribution that while not every judge thinks about efficiency in
decisionmaking, there must be some architectural or governance feature
pushing in the direction of efficiency—which exists in some areas of law and
not in others.20
The basis for a better understanding of the circumstances under which
the efficiency of common law is possible emerges from the writings of Nobel
laureate Jean Tirole21 and others who study what is commonly referred to as
“two-sided” markets or platforms.22  Professors Rochet and Tirole explain
that “many if not most markets with network externalities are characterized
by the presence of two distinct sides whose ultimate benefit stems from inter-
acting through a common platform.”23  Such markets are ubiquitous in life,
and their importance was recently recognized by the Supreme Court.24
There are a number of elements to a two-sided market.  First, two (or
more) sets of agents interact through an intermediary (or platform).  Sec-
ond, each of the actors of each side of the platform make decisions that
impact the decisionmaking of the other set(s) of actors on the other sides of
the platform.25
Two-sided markets have existed for thousands of years in “low tech”
industries.  For example, a shopping bazaar in ancient Rome, Jerusalem, or
Beijing connected retailers and end consumers.  Similarly, in the play Fidler
on the Roof, Yente the matchmaker sets up matches between buyers and sellers
for matrimonial services.  Other markets for which two-sided markets exist
19 See discussion infra Part II.
20 See discussion infra Part III.
21 For Jean Tirole’s background, see generally Jean Tirole, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www
.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2014/tirole/biographical/ (last visited Sept.
27, 2019).
22 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J.
ECON. 645, 645 (2006) [hereinafter Rocket & Tirole, Two-Sided Markets]; Jean-Charles
Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990,
990–94 (2003) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition]; Bernard Caillaud &
Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J.
ECON. 309, 309–11 (2003).
23 Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition, supra note 22, at 990.
24 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280–81, 2285–87 (2018).
25 See Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 125
(2009) (“[A] two-sided market is one in which (1) two sets of agents interact through an
intermediary or platform, and (2) the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes
of the other set of agents, typically through an externality.”); see also David S. Evans &
Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses, in 1 THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 404, 408–10 (Roger D. Blair
& D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015) (defining a multisided platform).
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include newspapers,26 securities,27 and payment systems.28  In the online
world, some of the well-known “high tech” two-sided platforms include com-
panies like Tinder, Uber, Facebook, and Amazon.
This Article explains two-sided markets, or platforms, generally and
applies the modular open-source platform model to law.  In doing so, it
explores concepts that impact the efficiency of such platforms—platform
governance, modularity, and fragmentation.29  Then, this Article applies the
understanding of platforms to a number of areas of law that might be under-
stood as more prone to economic analysis because the issues addressed in law
tend to be more “economic,” such as torts, bankruptcy, corporations, and
patents.30  In these areas, no combination of platform architecture and
modularity has allowed for the development of more efficient legal rules as a
general matter.  Finally, this Article studies antitrust law as the one area of
law that suggests that the efficiency of common law is possible and explores
the causal mechanism of necessary conditions that needs to be met.31  Anti-
trust law is different than other areas of law because of a singular goal, an
architectural governance based on a single federal court (the Supreme
Court) with few substantive legislative changes in the past one hundred years,
which provide for coherent governance of the platform.  This Article con-
cludes by discussing the implications of an efficient platform design for other
areas of law.
I. EFFICIENCY OF COMMON LAW
Posner argued that the common-law system created a set of incentives to
produce efficient behavior by parties both in formal and informal markets.32
This was based on an evolutionary approach to law.  Under the evolutionary
approach, judges could self-correct inefficient rulings with efficient rulings
over time.33
Others built off of Posner’s idea of the efficiency of the common law.
Professor Rubin set up a model in which an increase in the amount of funds
26 Elena Argentesi & Lapo Filistrucchi, Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market:
The Case of Newspapers, 22 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 1247, 1247 (2007).
27 Yong Chao et al., Discrete Pricing and Market Fragmentation: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets,
107 AM. ECON. REV. 196, 196–97 (2017).
28 O¨zlem Bedre-Defolie & Emilio Calvano, Pricing Payment Cards, AM. ECON. J.:
MICROECON., Aug. 2013, at 206, 209.
29 See discussion infra Part II.
30 See discussion infra Sections III.A–D.
31 See discussion infra Section III.E.  Ironically, antitrust was the area of much of Pos-
ner’s earliest work. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47–54, 58, 60–61, 71, 85–89 (1969); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy
and the Consumer Movement, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 361 (1970); Richard A. Posner, A Statistical
Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970); Richard A. Posner, A Program for
the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500 (1971).
32 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 98–99.
33 See id. at 320–21.
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for a particular case makes parties more willing to create doctrinal change
because of the long-term value in the shift in doctrine for future potential
cases.34  Rubin’s evolutionary theory of how the market shapes efficient rules
was that cases with more efficient rules would settle more often than cases of
less efficient rules.  This would lead to a shift in which litigation would be
more likely to overturn inefficient rules.35  This is a bottom-up formulation
of common law.
At roughly the same time, Professor Priest argued that the reason for
efficiency of the common law was demand based.  Priest set up an evolution-
ary model that was also bottom up in which inefficient legal rules would yield
to more efficient rules because there would be more cases in litigation due to
the inefficient rules.36  As such rules became more efficient as a result of
litigation, they would no longer be challenged, which would lead to mainte-
nance of the more efficient rules.  The more inefficient the rule, the greater
the stakes for high-stakes litigants to litigate to a decision to change the
rule.37  Priest’s further work in his Priest-Klein model suggests that the party
with the greater stake in the litigation is more likely to prevail.38  This exten-
sion would suggest that eventually there would be greater efficiency in com-
mon law over time.  Professors Cooter and Kornhauser similarly modeled
how common law might shift to efficient outcomes even without the assis-
tance of judges.39
The broader claim of the efficiency of the common law has even taken a
macro-level implication, that economic growth and property overall are tied
specifically to the use of common law.40  Such finance work on the efficiency
of common law is among the most cited work in the past twenty years.41
All of these thinkers were only partially correct in their analysis of the
efficiency of common law.  These approaches only point to the particular
mechanism of bottom-up change.  They do not address goals of the legal
34 See Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, supra note 8, at 52–55.
35 See id. at 61.
36 See Priest, The Common Law Process, supra note 8, at 65.
37 See id. at 67.
38 See Priest & Klein, supra note 12, at 28.  Katz further extended this to examine litiga-
tion expenditures. See Avery Katz, Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 127, 138–39 (1988).
39 Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of
Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 145–50 (1980).
40 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222,
232 (1999); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503–06 (2001).  Macroefficiency in the common law has its roots in
the work of Hayek, who claimed a bottom-up approach to law to create efficiency. See
generally 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF LIBERTY (1960).  How inefficiency in the market shapes the ways in which even
efficient rules are applied is beyond the scope of this Article.
41 Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467,
467, 468 (2010) (“[W]ell over a hundred published empirical papers used the original
ADRI.”).
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system from a top-down perspective that shapes the bottom-up development
of common law.42
In later work, Posner provided a general analysis of the top-down model
of judicial thinking43 that is different from many of the traditional bottom-up
models of how the judiciary changes law.  The top-down model is a supply-
side model of common-law efficiency, in which judges supply the framework
for the efficiency of the common law.  Posner argued that in top-down law-
making, the judge creates a theory about how law works to organize decided
cases to make them conform to the theory.44  There is nothing to suggest
that a legislature would not be equally good at creating a top-down singular
goal.  However, most enabling statutes have vague goals or multiple goals.
Multiple goals play an important role in inefficient outcomes, as nonef-
ficiency concerns impact judges.45  In such circumstances, when presented
with certain multiple goals, cases can come out in ways that are inefficient
but meet other goals, such as equitable goals.  The design structure based on
multiple goals may lead to doctrinal incompatibility and legal uncertainty in
decisionmaking.
Multiple goals, and nonefficiency goals in particular, explain many case
outcomes.  Some argue that law is always political.46  Under this approach,
the idea of the efficiency of common law is nothing other than a highly ideo-
logical deregulatory approach to governance.  Even the law-and-economics
movement, and particularly the public-choice literature, embraces a political
economy explanation to law’s development.  Public choice suggests that com-
mon law may be more efficient than statutory-based law because an indepen-
dent judiciary is better shielded from political pressure than the legislative
process.47  Further, the costs of inefficient statutory rules are spread out
more than those of inefficient judicial rulings such that it is harder to change
statute than caselaw.48
42 From the standpoint of goals, it is not clear that a statute is any more or less effective
than a judicially created goal.
43 Particularly, he targets the work of Dworkin. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW 175–88 (1995).  For other scholars who offer a top-down approach, see, for example,
Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 42
(1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43–72 (1980); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
44 See Posner, supra note 43, at 172.
45 See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 297 (2005);
David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Judging Measures, 77 UMKC L. REV. 381, 394–95, 404 (2008).
46 See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1526
(1991) (“Most people in the legal academy agree . . . that law is politics . . . .”); see also
Tonja Jacobi, The Judiciary, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
234, 252 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
47 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 328–29; Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges:
The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 850–53.
48 See Michael A. Crew & Charlotte Twight, On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice
Perspective, 66 PUB. CHOICE 15, 25 (1990) (“[I]n most judicial contexts the transaction
costs . . . are significantly less than the transaction costs of bringing about a legislative
change.”).
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Though verification is typically difficult for judge-made law in terms of
the motivations of judges, we can verify that antitrust law changed in a way
that was more efficient as to both substance and procedure based upon a
singular economic-welfare-based goal, as Section III.E explores.  Even Posner
concedes that this is precisely what happened in antitrust with regard to a
“consumer welfare” singular goal of antitrust versus the inefficiency of earlier
cases with multiple goals.49  Yet, both Rubin and Priest, both of whom wrote
and taught in antitrust, would have trouble arguing that most cases from anti-
trust’s origin to at least the late 1970s exhibited a bottom-up approach that
led to efficient outcomes.50  Indeed, things got much worse in the 1950s and
1960s in antitrust jurisprudence from an efficiency standpoint before they
got better.51
Changing the overall goal of law (judicial architecture) allows for “mod-
ular” changes, described below in Section II.B, across a number of related
areas of law.  This goal change can push to efficiency but equally push to
inefficiency.  Basic common-law areas like contracts, torts, and property are
uneven in the application of economic analysis both within the United States
and across other common-law countries.52  State-level law makes fragmenta-
tion of legal results for certain doctrines more likely than if there is not a
centralized singular decisionmaker such as federal law and the Supreme
Court.53
This Article argues that efficiency of the common law from this bottom-
up approach is only possible if there is first a top-down response from a cen-
tralized authority that creates a singular standard for a common-law subject
(assuming that the structures that produce common law themselves do not
change over time).  The critical insight is that common law can become more
efficient only when there is a singular goal of efficiency.  This is a necessary
but not sufficient condition.  This Article applies the combination of top-
down and bottom-up approaches that exist in modular-platform design to
identify where the efficiency of common law is possible.
49 Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The
Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433–35 (1992).
50 See Priest & Klein, supra note 12, at 52–54; Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law,
supra note 8, at 210–11.
51 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
928–29 (1979) (“[Antitrust jurisprudence] regularly advanced propositions that contra-
dicted economic theory.”).
52 See Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Go´mez Ligu¨erre, The Evolution of the Common Law and
Efficiency, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 340 (2012) (explaining that different jurisdictions
provide “different legal outcomes”).
53 See Steven G. Calabresi, Essay, Does Institutional Design Make a Difference?, 109 NW. U.
L. REV. 577, 581 (2015) (“[S]ubstantive law of contract, property, torts, inheritance, family
law, and criminal law are overwhelmingly areas of state law, which is not true in most other
federations.”).
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II. LAW AS A PLATFORM
We first begin with basic questions: What is a two-sided platform and
how does it work?  A two-sided platform is unlike a traditional market.  In a
one-sided market, a buyer deals directly with a seller.  For example, a law
professor may go to the American Airlines website to purchase a ticket from
New York to San Francisco.  A two-sided market adds value as an intermedi-
ary that connects two sides of a market.  For example, an online travel web-
site like Kayak or Expedia connects buyers and sellers.  The value of the two-
sided market (or platform) is the ability to make matches across both sides of
the market.54  Two-sided markets are ubiquitous to life, such as with dating
apps, stock exchanges, video games, credit cards, social networks, and com-
puter operating systems.  Two more in-depth examples illustrate how the
platform serves as an intermediary between the two sides of the market that is
distinct from a one-sided market.
A two-sided platform may be a newspaper like the New York Times or Wall
Street Journal.  The platform appeals to both sides of the market.  On one side
of the market are readers.  On the other side are advertisers.55  Though there
may be a subscription fee from readers, the vast majority of profit comes
from advertising.  That is, the price to one side of the market (readers) is
below the cost of acquiring and distributing the newspaper content.
In online markets, the differences between costs across the two sides of
the market are even more significant.  OpenTable is an online platform that
connects patrons to restaurants through a mechanism to book restaurant res-
ervations.56  Restaurants want greater certainty in terms of how much food to
order and how many line chefs and wait staff they need for a particular day
and time of day.  Patrons want the certainty of reservations so that they do
not need to wait for their table to be ready.  OpenTable’s platform allows this
exchange to make both sides better off and indeed the restaurants subsidize
the “free” side of the platform (patrons) by offering frequent-eater rewards.57
Much of the legal and economics academic work on platforms focuses
on issues of pricing and competition.58  For our purposes, the pricing
dynamics are not important.  This Article focuses on the existence of law as a
54 See Rochet & Tirole, Two-Sided Markets, supra note 22, at 645.
55 See id.
56 OPENTABLE, https://www.opentable.com/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
57 OpenTable Dining Rewards, OPENTABLE, https://help.opentable.com/s/article/
OpenTable-Dining-Rewards?language=en_US (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
58 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 25, at 411–13, 415–19 (providing a literature
review).  There is also a significant literature on platforms in related fields such as informa-
tion systems, marketing, strategy, operations management, and finance. See generally, e.g.,
Jennifer Brown & David A. Matsa, Boarding a Sinking Ship? An Investigation of Job Applications
to Distressed Firms, 71 J. FIN. 507 (2016); Thomas R. Eisenmann et al., Platform Envelopment,
32 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1270 (2011); Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Display Adver-
tising: Targeting and Obtrusiveness, 30 MARKETING SCI. 389 (2011); Alfred Taudes et al.,
Options Analysis of Software Platform Decisions: A Case Study, 24 MIS Q. 227 (2000) Amrit
Tiwana et al., Platform Evolution: Coevolution of Platform Architecture, Governance, and Environ-
mental Dynamics, 21 INFO. SYS. RES. 675 (2010).
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two-sided market and an issue that emerges for purposes of understanding
the architecture and governance of the judge-made law as a platform—how
open the platform is with regard to compatibility and integration.
In a sense, there are two conceptualizations of efficiency—the first
relates to Posner’s notion of efficiency in terms of the substantive law based
on allocative efficiency and the second to optimizing the efficiency of the
legal process of the court system itself to produce law.  We focus on the first.
Figure 1 below identifies how law as a platform works in practice.
FIGURE 1: THE TWO-SIDED MARKET FOR JUDGE-MADE LAW
AS AN OPEN-SOURCE MODULAR SYSTEM
Common law, as the forum/formal legal system, is a platform that con-
nects parties to adjudicators.  This is different from a one-sided legal market
such as the direct settling of business disputes of two parties via relational
contracts.59
One can take the analogy of law as a platform even further.  There are
two types of software platforms—open source and closed.  The closed plat-
form purposely reduces compatibility of the operating system.60  One well-
known example is Apple.  Apple has very strong control over the design and
manufacture of mobile devices and applications that run on the Apple iOS
operating system.  For example, a song downloaded on iTunes will not run
on a Windows-based player.  This may be like certain types of statutory law
with significant top-down control over the legal regime.  This is not to suggest
that a closed platform cannot be efficient.  Rather, the focus in this Article is
59 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, at vii (1991).
60 See, e.g., Chris Hoffman, Android Is “Open” and iOS Is “Closed”—But What Does That
Mean to You?, HOW-TO GEEK, https://www.howtogeek.com/217593/android-is-open-and-
ios-is-closed-but-what-does-that-mean-to-you/ (last updated June 20, 2017).
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on open-source platforms because common law looks like an open-source
platform, and so the emphasis is on understanding the common-law system.
The other type of operating system is an open operating system such as
Linux.  The platform is open “to the extent that (1) no restrictions are
placed on participation in its development, commercialization, or use; and
(2) any restrictions—for example, requirements to conform with technical
standards or pay licensing fees—are reasonable and non-discriminatory, that
is, they are applied uniformly to all potential platform participants.”61
The common-law judge-made-law approach to law resembles an open-
source platform.  Common-law development allows for experimentation in
terms of doctrinal developments.  Thus, courts create the possibility of effi-
ciency of the common law much the same way that open platforms
encourage greater competition within set parameters of the source code than
closed platforms.62
In this sense, openness of the platform is an important issue in platform
design.  To create an open system requires a set of agreements that requires
some amount of centralized control but not so much centralized control that
it loses the benefits of modularity.  To understand law as an open-source
modular platform, one must first understand open-source, modularity, and
platform architecture and governance, which this Article explores in the next
Section.
A. Platform Architecture and Governance
Platform design and governance play important roles in the functioning
of the platform.63  A platform requires overall stability for its design architec-
ture, but enough flexibility for modules to be functional in ways that still
allow for variety.64  A strong platform architecture with a more centralized
governance structure is required, as “without some form of strict governance
by the [multisided platform], each constituent might fail to take actions or
investments that would have positive spillover effects for the [multisided plat-
form] and its other constituents.”65  When the system architecture is badly
designed, the system will underperform from the standpoint of efficiency.66
61 Thomas R. Eisenmann et al., Opening Platforms: How, When and Why?, in PLATFORMS,
MARKETS AND INNOVATION 131, 131 (Annabelle Gawer ed., 2009).
62 GEOFFREY G. PARKER ET AL., PLATFORM REVOLUTION 212 (2016). (“[P]latforms
[must] expand the boundaries of the firm.  The shifting horizons of managerial influence
now make competition less significant for strategists than collaboration and co-crea-
tion . . . . The shift from protecting value inside the firm to creating value outside the firm
means that the crucial factor is no longer ownership but opportunity, while the chief tool is
no longer dictation but persuasion.” (footnote omitted)).
63 See Ron Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Manage-
ment in Product Organization and Design, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63, 64 (1996).
64 Tiwana et al., supra note 58, at 679.
65 Andrei Hagiu, Strategic Decisions for Multisided Platforms, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV.,
Winter 2014, at 71, 78; see also PARKER ET AL., supra note 62, at 1–15, 35–59, 157–82.
66 See Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 19, 23–24 (2002).
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Efficiency need not be the only value that is maximized in open source.
Indeed, there are a number of papers that suggest that a shared sense of
community drives some of the dynamics of open source.67  However, as a
positive matter, an efficient open-source platform bears the closest analogy to
common law.
Platform architecture impacts open source, which is akin to common-law
development.  Open source allows for innovation through allowing users of
the platform to add functionality by modifying code so long as the changes to
the system work within the standard interface.  Professor Arti Rai explains
that “[i]n most open-source communities, a small group of individuals
(sometimes just one individual) is responsible for distributing an initial set of
code or data.  The larger community, led at any given time by a core group,
then builds upon this code or data.”68  Legal precedent works in much the
same way in that particular doctrines will be used and modified by subse-
quent judges tinkering with the doctrine ostensibly to improve it with central-
ized control by higher courts.
Open-source development allows developers to augment the work of
others freely.69  Open source creates opportunities for individual program-
mers to add new functionality to source code and improve the system archi-
tecture organically through trial and error.70  Because open source is widely
available and open to public scrutiny, bugs in programming can be discov-
ered more rapidly.71  The open nature of source code allows for an inter-
ested programmer to add new functionality to the code with a related
application or other function based on the prior source code.  Open source
also allows for significant scale.72
Perhaps the best-known example of open source is the Linux operating
system.  However, other open-source projects include Tesla’s open source for
electric vehicle technology73 and Netflix’s open source for cloud computing
technology.74
67 See, e.g., Eric von Hippel, Essay, Innovation by User Communities: Learning from Open-
Source Software, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 2001, at 82.
68 Arti K. Rai, “Open Source” and Private Ordering: A Commentary on Dusollier, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2007).
69 Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Enforcement of Open Source Software Licenses: The MDY Trio’s
Inconvenient Complications, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 112 (2011) (“[O]pen source refers to
the software development model that is typically used in the open source community.  In
that model, a programmer creates software and posts the source code on the Internet, and
a community grows up around the software as developers exchange bug fixes and new
features.” (citing STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004))).
70 See WEBER, supra note 69, at 2, 11.
71 ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 33–36 (Tim O’Reilly ed., rev. ed.
2001).
72 See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks 67 (2006) (“[T]he open source move-
ment has shown . . . that this simple model can operate on very different scales.”).
73 Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA (June 12, 2014), https://www.tesla
.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.
74 NETFLIX OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE CENTER, https://netflix.github.io/ (last visited
Sept. 22, 2019).
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In spite of the bottom-up approach to open source, effective open-
source platforms require some hierarchy.  Professor Christopher Yoo notes
that the more successful open-source projects all have the same core fea-
ture—significant centralization of control.75  This perhaps comes as a sur-
prise given the rather collectivist notions often associated with the open-
source movement.76
Architectural design for platforms bears resemblance to issues of institu-
tional design in law, in which each institutional design is imperfect and yet
one needs to have a legal system that works more often than not given vari-
ous tradeoffs across institutional choices (some of which are independent
concerns from the two-sided nature of judge-made law).77  This is also
related to the literature in law on institutional design and to how law evolves
based on factors such as initial endowment, path dependency, public-choice
concerns, and various shocks to the legal system.78
Change may be easier for a particular doctrine rather than an entire
body of law.  In an open-source platform, this change is a function of a modu-
lar design of a legal system.  Without strong governance, it is difficult to make
changes to the platform.  That is, changing the overall institutional architec-
ture can be costly.79  Changing the overall architecture itself is difficult and
moves only slowly.  This is due to path dependence.80  In the legal system,
path dependence may occur because every incremental change in terms of
caselaw development is of low cost.81  This may be the case even if another
overall approach to the law may be superior.82
75 Christopher S. Yoo, Open Source, Modular Platforms, and the Challenge of Fragmentation,
1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 619, 631–32 (2016).
76 E.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software?, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 139, 139–41 (2011); Jeffrey A. Roberts et al., Understanding the Motivations, Participa-
tion, and Performance of Open Source Software Developers: A Longitudinal Study of the Apache
Projects, 52 MGMT. SCI. 984, 984 (2006); Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source
Software and the “Private-Collective” Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG.
SCI. 209, 209 (2003).
77 See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1–3
(2001); Eric S. Maskin, Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals, 98 AM. ECON. REV.
567, 567 (2008).
78 See Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 641, 641–43 (1996); see also Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of
Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43, 46, 62 (2007); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradi-
tion in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 38 (1985).
79 Eric von Hippel, Task Partitioning: An Innovation Process Variable, 19 RES. POL’Y 407,
409 (1990).
80 Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory and Internet Regulation, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
36, 38.
81 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607, 647–650 (2001).
82 See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205, 210 (1995).  Path dependence is similar to issues of lock-in standards.
See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Exter-
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B. Modularity
From the standpoint of platform architecture, a platform provides for
core functionality based on the modules that interoperate with the platform
and the various interfaces in which the platform operates.  A module is an
add-on component to the platform that connects to the platform for pur-
poses of functionality.  For example, if the platform is the Apple iPhone
operating system, a module may be an app.83
Modularity reduces complexity through a hierarchical decomposition of
a system into various components, like breaking out a legal rule or doctrine
into its various elements.84  Each of “[t]he components in a modular system
interact with one another through a limited number of standardized inter-
faces.”85  The strength of modularity is that it allows multiple people to work
on different parts of a system simultaneously by dividing up the system into
small parts that an individual or group of individuals can work on at one
time.86  This allows for “rapid trial-and-error learning,”87 since a module that
does not work can be modified without changing the entire system.
Companies that utilize modular architecture are able to swap out less
efficient modular parts for more efficient ones.88  Put differently, it is much
easier to adapt a modular component than an entire platform architecture,
and this adaption creates lower costs and greater speed of change.  This
adaptability allows for increased economic returns based on the division of
labor into modular components.89  As such, each module operates more or
nalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 825 (1986); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70–72 (1985).
83 Tiwana et al., supra note 58, at 675.
84 See Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 467,
477 (1962) (“The fact . . . that many complex systems have a nearly decomposable, hierar-
chic structure is a major facilitating factor enabling us to understand, to describe, and even
to ‘see’ such systems and their parts.”).
85 Timothy Simcoe, Modularity and the Evolution of the Internet, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 21, 23 (Avi Goldfarb et al. eds., 2015).
86 See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 100 (2003) (“Thus, firms will sometimes opt for modularity as a means of bring-
ing maximum imagination and diversity to the problem of developing applications on a
platform, and minimizing the need for complex coordination.”); see also Yoo, supra note
75, at 620.
87 Richard N. Langlois & Paul L. Robertson, Networks and Innovation in a Modular Sys-
tem: Lessons from the Microcomputer and Stereo Component Industries, 21 RES. POL’Y 297, 301
(1992).
88 See Alan MacCormack et al., Building the Agile Enterprise: IT Architecture, Modularity
and the Cost of IT Change 12 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-060, 2016).
89 Tiwana et al., supra note 58, at 678 (noting that breaking down various components
“minimizes interdependence among the evolution processes of components of the ecosys-
tem, supporting change and variation, and it also helps cope with complexity”); see also
David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collabora-
tion, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 295–98 (1986); Youngjin Yoo et al., The
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less independently of other modules (although some interactions remain)
while they are integrated within the larger system architecture.90
Open source complements modularity in some ways, as open source
requires individuals or groups to divide up various system subparts into work-
able units for change.91  Some areas in which modularity may be applied
include platform industries as diverse as healthcare,92 financial services,93
software,94 and the internet.95
There are efficiencies in breaking down products to the modular level.
A programmer need only understand the overall design architecture and
interactions with adjacent modules to make modular systems easier to
implement.96
Modular design also allows for swapping out different modules at differ-
ent speeds in parallel with each other.97  In a legal context, modularity allows
for courts to work their way through cases by a broader design rule and for
common-law jurisprudence to develop in a particular doctrine without dis-
turbing the rest of the system, so long as the overall architecture (the goal of
a particular substantive area of law) is maintained.
Professor Smith has used modularity to describe property law and to
explain property law’s ability to solve multiparty interactions over the use of
resources,98 while Professor Yoo has used it to describe internet law for areas
such as telecommunications network unbundling and network neutrality.99
This Article makes the claim that common law more generally is modular,
based upon a platform architecture that is open source.
New Organizing Logic of Digital Innovation: An Agenda for Information Systems Research, 21 INFO.
SYS. RES. 724, 727–28 (2010).
90 See Simon, supra note 84, at 477.
91 See Yoo, supra note 75, at 620.
92 Carolien de Blok et al., The Human Dimension of Modular Care Provision: Opportunities
for Personalization and Customization, 142 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 16, 17–19 (2013).
93 J.M. Liebenau et al., Modularity and Network Integration: Emergent Business Models in
Banking, 2014 PROC. 47TH ANN. HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI. 1183, 1186.
94 Alan MacCormack et al., Exploring the Structure of Complex Software Designs: An Empiri-
cal Study of Open Source and Proprietary Code, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1015, 1015, 1026–29 (2006).
95 Simcoe, supra note 85, at 33–41.
96 See Melissa A. Schilling & H. Kevin Steensma, The Use of Modular Organizational
Forms: An Industry-Level Analysis, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1149, 1161–63 (2001).
97 See Yoo, supra note 80, at 22 (“The existence of multiple dimensions along which a
design can be improved technologically unlocks the value identified by real option theory.
When potential technological improvements arise for systems that consist of a single, inter-
connected design, the architect only has a single decision: whether to adopt the improve-
ment or not.” (citing 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES 236, 238, 252
(2000))).
98 Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097,
2111–18 (2012).
99 Yoo, supra note 80, at 39–42, 50.
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C. Fragmentation
The value of modularity is of holding together the architectural integrity
of a platform by ensuring that programmers do not include interconnections
that fall outside of the architectural design.100  Thus, strict control is neces-
sary to enjoy the benefits of the architectural design.  Put differently, modu-
larity helps when the various outcomes are compatible with the system
architecture.  Where they are not compatible, modularity chills product
recombinations that would change the overall system architecture.101
The problem of too much modularity is that if there is not sufficient
control regarding the architecture onto each module, the system as a whole
will not be efficient.102  From an efficiency standpoint, the platform architec-
ture needs sufficient control to stimulate innovation in the modules.103
Without sufficient control, the lack of coordination across modules will cre-
ate problems of fragmentation.104
Fragmentation leads to divergent outcomes as processes break down
into different parts that are not compatible with each other.  From the per-
spective of an online platform and governance, fragmentation may occur as a
result of forking, where there are different versions of software code that can
be used.  Forking occurs as a result of a governance structure that is not
sufficient to prevent separating into different fragments.105  Typical proprie-
tary firms control their code to prevent forking.  In open source, code “fork-
ing” leads to situations in which competing developers work on incompatible
versions of software.106
Open source and modularity also may be in tension as a result of frag-
mentation.107  The possibility of fragmentation or forking has been a prob-
100 Id. at 10; see also David Lorge Parnas et al., The Modular Structure of Complex Systems,
1984 PROC. 7TH INT’L CONF. ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 408.
101 See Yoo, supra note 80, at 16–17.
102 See Henry W. Chesbrough & David J. Teece, When Is Virtual Virtuous? Organizing for
Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1996, at 65, 66–69 (“Coordinating a systemic innova-
tion is particularly difficult when industry standards do not exist and must be pioneered.
In such instances, virtual organizations are likely to run into strategic problems.”).
103 See Geoffrey Parker & Marshall Van Alstyne, Innovation, Openness, and Platform Con-
trol, 64 MGMT. SCI. 3015, 3018 (2018).
104 This is true not merely in software but in other platforms. See Kathryn Judge, Frag-
mentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 657, 686 (2012) (identifying fragmentation in financial services); Robin S. Lee & Tim
Wu, Subsidizing Creativity Through Network Design: Zero-Pricing and Net Neutrality, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 61, 67–68 (2009) (noting fragmentation in the internet).
105 See generally Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 103.  In some cases, it is possible for
the open source to be “hijack[ed]” by commercial vendors.  Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The
Scope of Open Source Licensing, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 20, 26, 30 (2005).
106 See Linus Nyman & Tommi Mikkonen, To Fork or Not to Fork: Fork Motivations in
SourceForge Projects, 2011 PROC. 7TH IFIP WG 2.13 INT’L CONF. 259, 259–66 (providing a
discussion of the motivations for code forking); Bruce Kogut & Anca Metiu, Open-Source
Software Development and Distributed Innovation, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 248, 257
(2001).
107 Yoo, supra note 75, at 620–21.
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lem in a number of open-source programs.  Perhaps the best-known case of
forking and fragmentation is found in what is known as the “Unix Wars” of
the 1980s and 1990s.
Unix is a well-known operating system, which Professor Timothy Simcoe
has described as “one of the most technically and commercially significant
operating systems in the history of computing.”108  The origins of Unix were
based on an innovation at the former AT&T Bell Laboratories.109  Because
AT&T was operating under a 1956 antitrust consent decree that required it
to license its patents,110 AT&T licensed it to universities on a royalty-free basis
but without any promise to fix any bugs.111  One leader that used Unix at the
university level was Bill Joy, who “released the first Berkeley Software Distribu-
tion . . . as an add-on to . . . Unix in 1977.”112  With the breakup of AT&T in
1982, AT&T was able to commercialize Unix as System V.113  Other compa-
nies also created their own versions of Unix and as AT&T sought to control
Unix, a rival group of companies created the Open Software Foundation.
The end of the 1980s led to forking and fragmentation of commercial
applications of Unix as a result.114  On the commercial side, Unix lost out to
Microsoft, and on the open-source side, Unix lost out to Linux.115
The lack of effective centralized governance meant that when faced with
fragmentation and potential forking, there was no mechanism to step in to
ensure that the system architecture would remain strong.  If the value of
modularity and open source was to have as many eyeballs as possible fix
potential bugs in the system and make improvements to it, the lack of a sin-
gular standard meant that Unix was less efficient than it needed to be to
remain the appropriate platform for software developers.116
Linux, a more modern open-source architecture, solved the problem of
forking through a more centralized authority for its governance.  We first
begin with a basic description of Linux to explain why its governance over
open-source material prevented forking.
108 Timothy Simcoe & Jeremy Watson, Forking, Fragmentation, and Splintering 24 (Bos.
Univ. Questrom Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2862234, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abs
tract=2862234.
109 See Martin Watzinger et al., How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell
Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree 7 (June 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.martin-watzinger.com/uploads/4/9/4/1/49415675/watzinger_et_al_2017.pdf
(“Scientists at Bell are credited with the development of . . . the Unix operating system.”).
110 Id. at 1, 5–7 (providing details on the 1956 consent decree).
111 Simcoe & Watson, supra note 108.
112 Id. at 24; see also Yoo, supra note 75, at 634–35.
113 Simcoe & Watson, supra note 108.
114 Yoo, supra note 75, at 634–36.
115 Id. at 635.
116 Id. at 635–36.
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Linux was developed by Linus Torvalds and programmers in the early
1990s.117  Torvalds had created the “kernel”—the computer code that man-
ages the functions of an operating system118—while still in college.119
The importance of a strong central authority for governance of the
architecture is critical to the success of open-source modular design.120  The
governance of Linux is built around Torvalds.121  He has what has been
described as a “benevolent[ ]” centralized system of control over the entire
system architecture.122  Thus, in spite of the possibility that anyone can add
to source code, in reality Torvalds (and his lieutenants) approve all changes
to the kernel.123  Modules that do not impact the kernel are allowed by
Torvalds.124  This prevents forking because it creates a common set of design
rules for all modules.125
III. APPLICATION OF PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE, MODULARITY,
AND FRAGMENTATION TO LAW
The literature on platform architecture suggests certain lessons for
understanding the efficiency of common law.  Multiplicity of goals within
substantive areas of law do not allow for sufficient centralization of platform
governance of legal doctrine by subject.  As a result, the legal system as a
platform ends up with a Tiebout model with sorting effects based on differ-
ent preferences and standards.126  This is not efficient, as any substantive
area of law lacks a unifying top-down goal for predictability and leads to dis-
parate, and inefficient, outcomes.  This insight alone does not require a two-
sided market analysis.  However, understanding law as a two-sided market
explains the open-source-like nature of law with a centralized authority gov-
ernance structure and modular design.
Fragmentation of the open-source nature of law is going to be more
likely when there are multiple decisionmakers in terms of top-down decision-
117 Kogut & Metiu, supra note 106, at 252.
118 Christopher Tozzi, Linux at 25: Why It Flourished While Others Fizzled, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-history/cyberspace/linux-at-25-why-it-
flourished-while-others-fizzled.
119 PAUL S. WANG, MASTERING LINUX 1–2 (2011).
120 See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS.
ECON. 197, 221 (2002) (explaining that an “important determinant of project success” is a
“strong centralization of authority”).
121 Kogut & Metiu, supra note 106, at 253.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, The Architecture of Participation: Does Code Archi-
tecture Mitigate Free Riding in the Open Source Development Model?, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1116, 1117
(2006) (“However, the different parts of a modular system must be compatible.  Compati-
bility is ensured by architectural design rules that developers obey and can expect others to
obey.”).
126 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL206.txt unknown Seq: 19  3-JAN-20 8:08
2019] rethinking  the  efficiency  of  the  common  law 813
making, akin to Unix.  In law, state law and state courts are more likely to
lead to fragmentation of doctrinal outcomes than federal law.  Even code-
based law is not merely a cut-and-paste as it evolves via judicial interpretation.
State courts might interpret the same statute differently and create variation,
or a local court might ignore the statute.127  In most of federal law, the
Supreme Court is the ultimate decisionmaker as to doctrinal development.
Procedural rules intersect with substantive areas of law in significant
ways, making efficiency of common law more or less likely based on the weed-
ing out of nonmeritorious cases from the litigation pipeline.  Because courts
see only a fraction of total disputes, there are limits to the types of cases that
judges would see to explicitly create a more efficient legal system.128  Simi-
larly, judicial path dependence and asymmetric litigant stakes create dynamic
processes of case selection that may lead to doctrinal shifts.129  This Article
notes this procedural dynamic but focuses Sections III.A–E on particular doc-
trinal areas of law based on substantive areas.
The next Sections of this Article provide a set of examples across a num-
ber of areas of law that demonstrate the importance of both the centralized
governance with a singular goal (which requires not merely consensus in law,
but some level of academic consensus on the goal) and the importance of
modular design that does not permit fragmentation.  Without both the open-
source modular design and centralized authority, any gains of modularity are
erased by significant fragmentation.  This prevents the efficiency of common
law and explains why most areas of judge-made law overall have not become
more efficient.130
127 Fragmentation itself is not all bad.  Federalism arguments suggest the idea of states
as laboratories for experimentation, so we might worry about inefficient lock-in.  However,
the ability to swap out bad doctrine for good doctrine limits inefficient lock-in, as the
efficiency of common law theorists argue.
128 See Peter H. Aranson, The Common Law as Central Economic Planning, 3 CONST. POL.
ECON. 289, 300–02 (1992).
129 See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A
Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419, 429–30 (2003) (discussing the consequences of
allowing policy views of judges to affect outcomes of cases); Vincy Fon et al., Litigation,
Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal Change, 20 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43, 52–54 (2005).
130 Though this Article focuses on substantive law and its efficiency, concerns of frag-
mentation also impact procedural issues.  Jurisdictions (and fora) might compete with
each other for particular types of cases.  This may impact litigation outcomes.  However,
whether or not such jurisdictional competition is efficient depends. See Todd J. Zywicki, Is
Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1146 (2006)
(book review) (explaining that such competition can be either “good or bad . . . depend-
ing on the institutional structure surrounding it and the incentives of the parties partaking
in it”); see also Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1182–83 (2007) (finding a proplaintiff bias in premodern
England); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 253–55 (1979) (identifying plaintiff forum shopping).  However, such
forum selling can self-correct efficiently when there is a singular high-level court that can
reduce the incentives to forum shop, as recently happened in patent cases because of
Supreme Court intervention.  TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S.
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This Article provides an informal rank ordering based on how strongly
the legal architecture of a given substantive area of law pushes in the direc-
tion of efficiency.  At the top would be antitrust, with a centralized deci-
sionmaker and an academic and judicial appreciation of how antitrust rules
affect consumer welfare (a form of efficiency).  Next, perhaps, would be cor-
porate law, with very important decisionmakers in the Delaware legislature
and Chancery and Delaware Supreme courts, and a focus on maximization of
shareholder value.  At the bottom would be torts, where there are fifty deci-
sionmakers who appear to focus on questions of ex post fairness as much as
they do on efficiency.
A. Tort Law
Tort is a common law that is decided primarily at the state level.
Because there are fifty different state supreme courts (fifty different system
architectures), fragmentation is possible across each of the fifty systems.  This
fragmentation occurs in practice, as Restatements have not solved the issue
of fragmentation,131 nor is there a singular goal for tort policy.132
Ideological divergence in legal scholarship also makes orientation to a
singular goal difficult.  In torts, rights-based approaches vie with economic-
based approaches in scholarship.133  Without a clear vision as to what
approach law should take as a policy matter as the centralizing feature to
governance of law, modular design has competing goals for judges to utilize
when framing their decisions.  These competing goals lead to inefficient
modular solutions because competing governance structures based on differ-
ent goals make convergence toward more efficient law more difficult.
In spite of normative work to try to shape tort law to a more economic
approach by law-and-economics scholars,134 a recent article by Professor
Ct. 1514, 1516–17 (2017). But see Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently
Unexceptional Venue Statute, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1030–31 (2017) (arguing that TC Heart-
land may result in increased doctrinal fragmentation and increase litigation costs).  In
other settings, corporate law is an area where jurisdictional competition has led to more
efficient legal rules designed to maximize the value of firms and ultimately impact alloca-
tive efficiency. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 148 (1993).
131 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM (AM. LAW INST. 2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.
(AM. LAW INST. 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
132 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1491–92 (2010) (providing a law-and-economic analysis of tort law for
product liability). But see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for
Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919,
1942–43 (2010) (offering a critical view to the traditional law-and-economics model).
133 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193–94 (1977); Gregory C.
Keating, A Social Contract Conception of the Tort Law of Accidents, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW
OF TORTS 22, 22, 33–34 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Richard W. Wright, Justice and Rea-
sonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 145 (2002).
134 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 312–16 (1987) (providing descriptive and normative arguments for the use of eco-
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Noah surveys a series of basic issues including: parental negligence, prenatal
injury claims, contributory negligence defense, waivers of liability, negligent
entrustment claims, dram shop liability, and landowner duties to trespassers
(among others).135  He finds often that there are more than two approaches
to such questions among state courts in the United States.136  Other work
suggests that at times courts within a state may take internally inconsistent
positions,137 only adding to the forking problem.
B. Bankruptcy Law
Unlike common-law systems, statutes do not have a discrete evolutionary
aspect to them.  As a result, they are not bound by stare decisis and there can
be significant shifts in statutory treatment.  However, the cost of changing a
statute, rather than not changing based on a new legislature’s preference,
may be costly.138
Bankruptcy law is primarily federal once a debtor or creditor seeks bank-
ruptcy relief.  This idea was enshrined originally in the Constitution.139
Though the bankruptcy code has made certain important changes to particu-
lar statutory provisions and caselaw development, core elements remain
because of the cost of completely revamping the bankruptcy system.
Within bankruptcy law there are multiple goals.  The basis for the com-
peting goals comes from the code itself.  In bankruptcy, there are two poten-
tial competing goals—protection of labor and efficiency.  The legislative
history reflects this duality.  In 1977, the House Judiciary Committee wrote in
its report on Chapter 11 that:
The purpose of a business reorganization case . . . is to restructure a busi-
ness’s finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with
jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. . . . It is
more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it pre-
serves jobs and assets.140
nomic analysis for tort law); see also LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE 85–154 (2002) (advocating that tort liability rules should be based on economic
welfare, often to minimize the total cost of accidents).
135 See generally Lars Noah, “Go Sue Yourself!” Imagining Intrapersonal Liability for Negli-
gently Self-Inflicted Harms, 70 FLA. L. REV. 649 (2018).
136 Id. at 689–90, 690 nn.187–88.
137 See Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance
Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 392–93, 393 n.80 (2005).
138 See Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An
Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 394–95 (2008).
139 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Whether or not the bankruptcy system should be de-federal-
ized is a different issue. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy
Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1437–38 (1985); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 512–44 (1994).
140 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
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The misuse of resources for creditors and protection of jobs are poten-
tially different goals.141  This language, which promotes both jobs and assets,
has been noted by the Supreme Court to offer support for the proposition
that “[t]he fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor
from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible mis-
use of economic resources.”142  In this sense the goals remain muddled.
There is also divergence within academic thought.  The traditional law-
and-economics approach to bankruptcy, offered by Professor Baird suggests
that bankruptcy has a singular efficiency goal, that of maximizing the return
to creditors.143  This literature has long rejected that reorganization should
be promoted for its own sake.144  The usual efficiency focus in the literature
is minimizing the cost of credit.
There is an alternative approach to the traditional law-and-economics
approach.  Senator (and former professor) Warren argues that the bank-
ruptcy system must engage with broader distributive concerns.145  For her,
on a more macro level, employment should be preserved when bankruptcy is
a more effective tool to maintain jobs than government support in cases of
unemployment.146  Recent work by Professor Liscow suggests that microef-
ficiency matters, but that at a more macro level, employment should be pre-
served when bankruptcy is a more effective tool to maintain jobs than
government support in cases of unemployment.147  Without a consistent aca-
demic approach that dominates the discourse, judges can pick and choose
approaches to shape how they view bankruptcy law.
In bankruptcy caselaw and statute, a number of inefficient aspects of the
code have been reduced or eliminated since 1978, such as emergency
orders148 or debt collection solutions.149  This is not to suggest that in other
cases, bankruptcy law has not remained inefficient.150  These include, among
141 There is also an equity norm, although David Skeel notes that this norm seems to be
disappearing.  David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV.
699, 700–01 (2017).
142 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
143 Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822–28 (1987).
144 See Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
523, 533 (1992); Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356, 356–58 (2001); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 775–77 (1988); Richard M. Hynes, Optimal Bank-
ruptcy in a Non-Optimal World, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1, 45–62 (2002).
145 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 788–93 (1987).
146 Id. at 787–88.
147 Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employ-
ment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1483–95 (2016).
148 See Elizabeth Warren, Essay, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 336, 348 (1993).
149 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 151–90 (1986).
150 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Essay, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107
YALE L.J. 1807, 1809 (1998). But see Lynn M. LoPucki, Essay, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE. L.J. 317, 318–20 (1999).
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others, the ipso facto clauses regarding excusing the solvent party from a
contract where the other contracting party becomes insolvent.151
Bankruptcy law teaches that even when there are specialized courts, par-
ticular contexts—such as bankruptcies of large financial institutions—may
present a different set of facts for which the specific bankruptcy adjudicator
may have less competence than might otherwise be required.152  This con-
cern goes to the institutional competencies even of specialized courts.
Overall, the example of bankruptcy law suggests that the lack of a singu-
lar economic goal—and a lack of academic consensus as to how to reach
goals—limits the ability to create a more efficient system as a matter of archi-
tectural governance.  These factors prevent the benefits of modularity to
swap out inefficient doctrines for more efficient ones and explain uneven
outcomes in terms of efficiency in bankruptcy law.
C. Corporate Law
Corporate law is largely common law created at the state level.  The basic
divide is between the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) and stat-
utes based on the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA).153  Delaware
also has a chancery court that has developed specialization in corporate law
and corporate governance matters.154  Members of the Delaware Supreme
Court, such as Chief Justice Strine, have served in the chancery court and are
familiar, on appeal, with many corporate law issues.155  Whether or not such
specialization in Delaware business law leads to higher156 or lower quality157
remains an open question.
151 See Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inef-
ficient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 462 (1999).
152 See Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy, Banks and Non-Bank Finan-
cial Institutions, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 435, 450 (2012) (discussing limitations of bankruptcy
judges); see also Paulette J. Delk, Special Masters in Bankruptcy: The Case Against Bankruptcy
Rule 9031, 67 MO. L. REV. 29, 36–37 (2002).
153 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 10 (3d ed. 2015).
154 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1212 (2001) (“[D]elaware boasts a well-developed corporate case
law.  Because many corporate disputes arise under Delaware law, Delaware’s case law is
more developed than the case law of other states.”).
155 See Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, DELA-
WARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-court-chancery-supreme-court/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2019).
156 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1789–93 (2011); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 553–56 (2001).
157 See William J. Carney et al., Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware Corporate
Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 123, 125 (2012) (“Delaware is chosen because of the ignorance
of investors.  Because so many corporations are incorporated in Delaware—especially most
large ones—many investors are familiar only with Delaware corporate law and with busi-
nesses that are incorporated there.  Even if other states’ laws are superior, investors prefer
incorporation in familiar Delaware.”).
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Wealth maximization is the framing for efficiency in the corporate law
context.  Both DGCL and MBCA are silent on this issue as far as explicit
statutory provisions are concerned.  Both contain only provisions stating that
the corporation may pursue any lawful purpose.158  Further, most corporate
charters track the statute and make no reference to profit maximization.159
The silence of DGCL and MBCA (as to specific statutory provisions) is
distinguished from American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate
Governance.  Section 2.01 provides: “[A] corporation . . . should have as its
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corpo-
rate profit and shareholder gain.”160  However, none of these provisions
explicitly mandate maximization of profit.  From an efficiency perspective, it
would be wealth maximization that would lead to more efficient outcomes
rather than wealth enhancement.161
In caselaw and academic circles, wealth maximization follows from the
idea of shareholder primacy.  Yet, what is meant by shareholder primacy (and
if it should be the goal) remains somewhat contested in legal academic cir-
cles.162  Further, even within shareholder primacy, the meaning of share-
holder value remains contested.  While Professors Hansmann and Kraakman
famously declared in 2001 that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor
to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term
shareholder value,”163 in fact, academic scholarship has been contentious as
to short-term versus long-term shareholder value in more recent years.164
158 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2019); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2016).
159 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation, art. III (May 22,
2012), http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/efxapi/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFiling
HtmlSection1?SectionID=8742426-272341-306277&SessionID=boy7ejaYAmhg577.
160 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 1994).
161 However, there is a growing literature that firms also seek to maximize their envi-
ronmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) profile for firm investments.  For arti-
cles on the growing importance of ESG, see, for example, Benjamin R. Auer, Do Socially
Responsible Investment Policies Add or Destroy European Stock Portfolio Value?, 135 J. BUS. ETHICS
381 (2016); Gerhard Halbritter & Gregor Dorfleitner, The Wages of Social Responsibility—
Where Are They? A Critical Review of ESG Investing, 26 REV. FIN. ECON. 25 (2015); Caroline
Flammer, Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Reaction: The Environmental Awareness
of Investors, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 758 (2013).
162 See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 2–4 (2012); William W. Brat-
ton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653,
655–62 (2010); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 638 (2006). But see REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 28 & n.79 (2d ed. 2009) (advocating Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as the sole
criterion for corporate law); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Share-
holder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735–36 (2006).
163 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
164 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short- and Long-Term Investors (and
Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 396 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016)
(providing a literature review); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth That Insulating Boards
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Caselaw generally favors long-term over short-term value.  For example,
in Gantler v. Stephens, the Supreme Court of Delaware recognized that
“enhancing the corporation’s long term share value” is a “distinctively corpo-
rate concern[ ].”165  In other cases, the duty to long-term shareholders is not
as clear.  In Air Products & Chemicals v. Airgas, the Court of Chancery of Dela-
ware described that “[d]irectors of a corporation still owe fiduciary duties to
all stockholders—this undoubtedly includes short-term as well as long-term
holders.”166  Perhaps the best case for short-termism is Revlon v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc.167 itself, where getting the best price is indeed what a
board is required to do,168 even though further cases provide wiggle room as
to what exactly a board must do to ensure that it gets the best price.
On fundamental questions of system architecture, the shift to share-
holder primacy and to an economic approach as a matter of law has been
pronounced in the past thirty years in Delaware.  Undertaking an analysis of
the use of shareholder-centric concepts in caselaw, Professor Rhee finds an
explosion of cases that focus in the area, starting with the 1980s and the
Revlon decision.169  He notes the spread of such discussion beyond the Revlon
context for change-of-control transactions to other doctrines (such as corpo-
rate charters, shareholder voting rights, derivative suits, and shareholder
inspection rights),170 such that shareholder wealth maximization has been
discussed in eighty-eight Revlon cases and fifty-one non-Revlon cases by Dela-
ware courts to date.171  He concludes that though the courts are not always
clear as to the goal, the basis for Delaware law is director primacy.172  What
his study makes clear is that over time, the basis for decisions with such lan-
guage of director primacy and wealth maximization have been recognized as
a positive matter, and as the organizing framework for Delaware corporate
law across a number of doctrines.173
There has not been as pronounced a shift in cases under the MBCA
jurisdictions to wealth maximization, no doubt in part because with so many
Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (2013); K.J. Martijn Cremers &
Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 79–84
(2016); Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J.
1554, 1574 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face:
Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and
Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 26 (2010).
165 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (en banc).
166 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch. 2011).
167 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
168 Id. at 182.
169 Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951,
1984–90 (2018).
170 Id. at 1990–2001.
171 Id. at 1984–87.
172 Id. at 1967; see also Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“No
court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that goal, because they will be facing a
unique combination of circumstances, many of which will be outside their control.”).
173 Rhee, supra note 169, at 1951–56.  He does not measure short- versus long-term
shareholder value.
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MBCA states, it is more difficult for the norm to crystalize as law under so
many different state laws, as contrasted to Delaware, with its specialized Court
of Chancery.
Overall, though corporate law has some elements that push towards
greater efficiency of common law, a number of problems remain.  One is
endogeneity.  Courts respond to federal-level changes in corporate govern-
ance, as Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and other legislative intervention (and
the fear thereof) shape court decisions where Delaware may become more
aggressive because of the shadow of federal encroachment into corporate
governance.  Second, there is fragmentation as between different courts
across jurisdictions.  MBCA courts are more likely to have indeterminate
goals and results.  This is not surprising given that there are many such courts
and fragmentation is more likely as a result.  In Delaware, it is increasingly
clear in the caselaw that firms are run for shareholders and profit maximiza-
tion is the norm.174  Fragmentation is less of a problem in corporate law
since so many public companies have migrated to Delaware—but even there,
case outcomes are at times about positioning Delaware vis-a`-vis other states,
rather than efficient outcome of cases.175  Further, even in Delaware while
shareholder wealth maximization has taken hold not merely as a norm, but
potentially as law, the exact idea of whose wealth is being maximized (short-
term versus long-term shareholders) remains an open question both within
the academic literature and caselaw.176  Thus, efficiency of common law in
corporate law remains somewhat elusive as there is both lack of a singular
goal for architectural governance of the system and fragmentation across
multiple state courts.
D. Patent Law
In patent law, there are specialized courts and the applicable law is fed-
eral.  This specialization leads to more or less exclusive jurisdiction over the
initial appeal of patent cases.177  Starting in 1982, the Federal Circuit has
been granted the authority to hear all appeals from district courts for cases
“arising under[ ] any Act of Congress relating to patents.”178  Further, Con-
174 See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 761, 768 (2015).
175 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 851, 875–76 (2016); Matthew D. Cain et al., Essay, The Shifting Tides of Merger
Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 639–40 (2018).
176 See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text.
177 Among the exceptions are the Walker Process cases. See Leon Greenfield & Mark
Ford, Walker Process and Sham Litigation, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND HIGH TECH 271, 271–73 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol
eds., 2017) (explaining that usually a patent suit is the only claim one can make, but in
exceptional cases, an antitrust suit may be available).  Another results from Gunn v. Min-
ton, 568 U.S. 251, 264–65 (2013).
178 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012); see also id. § 1338(a).
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gress granted the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction for appeals that arise
from the decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office179 and from the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion.180  This subject-matter mandate provides the Federal Circuit with a
near monopoly on patent-related appeals with only occasional intervention
by the Supreme Court.181  Though patent law focuses on promotion of inno-
vation, what exactly that means and how strong the patent right should be
remains contested in the academic literature.182
In practice, there are two rival architectures for the setup of patent law.
One is the Federal Circuit and the other is the Supreme Court.  For the early
part of the Federal Circuit’s existence—when the Supreme Court did not
regularly take patent cases—the Federal Circuit was held as “the de facto
supreme court of patents.”183  The Supreme Court has become more active
in patent cases, no longer ceding such cases solely to the authority of the
Federal Circuit.184  However, in terms of architecture, both the Federal Cir-
cuit and Supreme Court continue to battle as to how to shape the contours of
patent law.185  As a normative matter, some view the decisionmaking by the
Federal Circuit as misguided.186  Professors Nard and Duffy suggest that it is
centralization of intellectual property in the Federal Circuit that has led to
problems with innovation policy in the courts.187
The goals of patent law beyond encouraging innovation remain some-
what unclear as well.  On economic questions, the Supreme Court and Fed-
eral Circuit are sometimes at odds.  For example, Professors Lemley and
McKenna view patent exhaustion and first-sale doctrines in a procompetitive
light, noting that their doctrinal value is that they are a “powerful tool for
179 Id. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
180 Id. § 1295(a)(6) (granting exclusive jurisdiction for appeals “relating to unfair prac-
tices in import trade” pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930).
181 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 664 (2009).
182 See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Anti-Commons Revisited, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 127,
128–30 (2015); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998); Ryan Lampe & Petra
Moser, Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation—Evidence from 20 US Industries Under the New
Deal, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 32–33 (2015); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup
and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992–93 (2007); Robert Merges, Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 76
(1994).
183 Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
387, 387.
184 Timothy. R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THE-
ORY 62, 63–64 (2013).
185 See id. at 69–70.
186 See e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT 1–15, 61–97 (2012); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study
in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1989); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1627–37 (2007).
187 Nard & Duffy, supra note 186, at 1627–37.
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reducing the market power of an IP owner.”188  However, the economic basis
of such claims of efficiency in patent law are disputed by those who take a
strong IP stance, such as Professor Epstein, who argues that these doctrines
are an attack on the “alienability of intellectual property licenses.”189  Others
argue for a more economic-based approach based on importing an antitrust-
style-efficiency framework.190
The analytical framework used is not always clear, even in Supreme
Court cases.191  In more recent years, the Supreme Court has been more
active in patent cases.192  Professor Gugliuzza, however, suggests that most
foundational patent-law issues (e.g., novelty, disclosure, nonobviousness, and
patent eligibility) have not been addressed much by the recent activity of the
Supreme Court.193  Instead, recent Supreme Court cases have fallen into one
of three categories: first, issues that arise in federal cases more generally,
such as jurisdiction, procedure, and remedies; second, issues that present
questions that could potentially harmonize patent law with other areas of
substantive law; and third, cases involving discrete provisions of patent law.194
Gugliuzza suggests, “The typical setup of a Supreme Court patent case is that
the Court overturns a rigid Federal Circuit rule that appears inconsistent
with doctrine in another area of the law or with clear statutory language.  The
Court then replaces that rule with a more context-sensitive standard.”195
Patent law is federal law, and so the possibility of fragmentation is lower
than for a state common-law area such as torts.  However, with two courts
battling to shape patent law (the Federal Circuit hears lots of cases while the
Supreme Court only intervenes occasionally),196 patent law lacks a coherent
singular goal in its architecture to lead to efficient outcomes generally.  The
188 Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Defi-
nition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2115 (2012); see also Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 917–21 (2008) (suggesting that patent
exhaustion leads to more efficient outcomes because it reduces information costs).
189 Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 502 (2010).
190 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Response, Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133,
2155 (2012).
191 See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 71 (2010) (offering
potential solutions to nonexpert judges).
192 Golden, supra note 181, at 658.
193 Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 330, 331, 338 (2017).
194 Id. at 334–38; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit:
Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29–30 (2007)
(providing an alternative schema for patent cases before the Supreme Court).
195 Gugliuzza, supra note 193, at 344.
196 The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have consistent views of the goals of
patents, though vehemently disagree on how to strike the right balance.  The Supreme
Court has broader goals in mind when it views patent law as merely part of the tapestry of
law and not something exceptional. See Holbrook, supra note 184, at 64–65.
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particular economic approach often remains unclear.197  Further, Congress
has intervened in patent law in significant ways.  The America Invents Act
made important changes such as to shift patent rights from a first-to-invent to
the first-to-file regime among other changes.198  These statutory interven-
tions changed the trajectory of the efficiency of common law.
E. Antitrust Law
1. Antitrust as Common Law
Antitrust is primarily federal law.  However, antitrust common law func-
tions somewhat differently than other fields.  It is antitrust’s enabling legisla-
tion that allows for common-law-like development.199  Professor Hovenkamp
explains that common law in the antitrust context typically “refers to the
power of the courts to devise specific rules that interpret a broadly worded
statute.  The phrase is not generally used to suggest that federal antitrust law
today follows the common law of restraints on trade.”200  In practice, statutes
such as the Sherman Act enjoy a certain rank akin to a constitutional com-
mon law.201
The Supreme Court offered an early articulation of this constitution-like
principle to the Sherman Act in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States.202
There, the Court stated:
197 Some scholars suggest that patent rights should be weak. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 216 (2008); Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The
Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3–4 (2013); see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 167–70 (2009); Joseph
Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1347, 1362 (2008).
Other scholars extol the value of strong patent protection. See, e.g., Petra Moser, How Do
Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON.
REV. 1214, 1214 (2005); Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a
Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-Country Analysis of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection,
1978–2002, 89 REV. ECON & STAT. 436, 436 (2007); Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter,
Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms,
32 RAND J. ECON. 77 (2001); Mark A. Thompson & Francis W. Rushing, An Empirical
Analysis of the Impact of Patent Protection on Economic Growth: An Extension, 24 J. ECON. DEV. 67
(1999).
198 Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Opening Statement, The America Invents Act
Jeopardizes American Innovation, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 230 (2012).
199 See Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy 228–29 (1955) (“[I]n adopting
the standard of the common law Congress expected the courts not only to apply a set of
somewhat vague doctrines but also in doing so to make use of that ‘certain technique of
judicial reasoning’ characteristic of common law courts.” (quoting ALBERT M. KALES, CON-
TRACTS AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE 106 (1918)).
200 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 214 n.7
(1985) (emphasis omitted).
201 See Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative
Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1473 (2000).
202 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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As a charter of [economic] freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provi-
sions.  It does not go into detailed definitions which might either work injury
to legitimate enterprise or through particularization defeat its purposes by
providing loopholes for escape.203
This framework changes how the Supreme Court views antitrust jurispru-
dence.  Traditional stare decisis typically means that the Supreme Court is
reluctant to overrule its precedent.204  Antitrust works differently.
Unlike other areas of law, economic advances shape the rethinking of
antitrust rules.  Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has stepped in to revise
antitrust law based on the current understanding of economics to narrow or
overrule precedents.205  As such, stare decisis does not have the same mean-
ing in antitrust as it does in other fields.
The view that antitrust should be less beholden to precedent than other
fields because of the centrality of economic analysis has been identified by
the Supreme Court.  For example, in State Oil Co. v. Khan the Court
explained:
[T]he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Con-
gress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted
view that Congress “expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.” . . . [The] Court . . . recon-
sider[s] its decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical
underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question.206
This view of antitrust as a variation of common law has taken hold even in the
most recent cases.
The fundamental shift, which this Section will explore in greater detail,
is an explicit recognition by the Supreme Court of a common-law approach
to antitrust based in economic analysis.  As the Court stated most recently in
2015 in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, “We have therefore felt relatively free
203 Id. at 359–60. But see Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the
Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 292, 322–28 (1986) (criticizing this
conceptualization).
204 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932) (“Stare decisis is
not . . . [an] inexorable command. . . . Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right. . . . [E]ven where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction
can be had by legislation.  But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correc-
tion through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its
earlier decisions.” (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
205 See Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2015, at 1, 5; see
also Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408–10
(2004) (significantly qualifying though not overruling unilateral refusals to deal under
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 (1993) (not striking down the
Robinson-Patman statute as economically unjustified and inimical to antitrust law).
206 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
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to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to
reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive conse-
quences.”207  This explicit emphasis of economic analysis in antitrust com-
mon law makes it unique among major substantive areas of law that fit within
the two-sided market modular design for efficient outcomes.  Unlike corpo-
rate law and patent law, there has not been a significant statutory reworking
of antitrust since 1950, even as caselaw has shifted significantly since that
time.208  This allows for an efficiency of common law to develop under cer-
tain conditions based on economic consensus in antitrust.
2. Antitrust and Goals
In its pre-1970s antitrust jurisprudence, the Supreme Court offered mul-
tiple goals for antitrust.  This included the protection of small businesses and
inefficient competitors.209  Some of the most famous formulations of
noneconomic goals include statements such as Trans-Missouri’s regarding
“small dealers and worthy men whose lives had been spent [in a business
setting],”210 Alcoa’s “one of [antitrust’s] purposes was to perpetuate and pre-
serve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of indus-
try in small units which can effectively compete with each other,”211 and
Brown Shoe’s “we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote compe-
tition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.  Con-
gress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from
the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.”212  As a result, until
the late 1970s, by today’s standards, the Supreme Court and lower courts
often got antitrust cases wrong as a matter of economic analysis.  Professor
Turner termed the jurisprudence of the 1950s and 1960s as antitrust’s “inhos-
pitality tradition.”213
207 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015).
208 Indeed, the Supreme Court treats antitrust differently with regard to statutory
changes relative to other areas of law. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 20 (noting “the general
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect
to the Sherman Act”).
209 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1989).
210 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
211 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
212 Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 344.
213 Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic
Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1322 n.124 (2013); Oli-
ver E. Williamson, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Leveraged Buyouts: An Efficiency Assessment, in
CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1, 21 n.24 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk ed., 1990) (cit-
ing N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 27, 29 (Trade Regulation
Reports ed. 1968)).
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Inhospitality meant that that judges created inefficient doctrine in a
number of areas: competitor effects were taken into account in mergers,214
merger efficiencies were ignored if not considered outright unlawful,215 ver-
tical price and nonprice restraints were per se illegal,216 unilateral refusals to
deal were significantly limited,217 intellectual property was not respected and
subject to the Antitrust Division’s “nine no-nos” of patent licensing,218 hori-
zontal restraints were unnecessarily applied when there might be procompe-
titive justification,219 and rules against efficient price discrimination were
aggressively enforced.220  These case outcomes based upon noneconomic
goals are not part of modern antitrust.221
Areas of antitrust that were economically unsound and created under a
common-law approach suggest that antitrust law was inefficient and that the
thinking was not causally based on an economic effects-based approach.
Antitrust, the area most economic in its approach, is the prime example of
the limitations on traditional thinking of the efficiency of common law.
It cannot be that the same judges that for two generations created ineffi-
cient rules simply woke up one day and decided to switch to efficient rules
based on repeat litigants pushing caselaw from the bottom up.  How then can
214 See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 345–46; Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 428
(“[G]reat industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their eco-
nomic results.”).
215 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality.  Congress was aware that some mergers which
lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of pro-
tecting competition.”).
216 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151–54 (1968); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 373 (1967); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
217 See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1959).
218 See Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial,
Price and Quantity Restrictions, in ANTITRUST PRIMER 11, 11–14 (Sara-Ann Sanders ed., 1970).
219 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972).
220 See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 690 (1967); FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44 (1948).
221 Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2506–07 (2013); William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Anti-
trust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 57 (2000); Acting
Assistant Attorney General Andrew Finch Delivers Remarks at Global Antitrust Enforcement Sympo-
sium, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-
assistant-attorney-general-andrew-finch-delivers-remarks-global-antitrust (“Economics has
played, and will continue to play, a fundamental role in antitrust enforcement.”). But see
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 268 (1991) (“One of
the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an ‘economic
approach’ to antitrust problems only in the 1970’s.  At most, this ‘revolution’ in antitrust
policy represented a change in economic models.  Antitrust policy has been forged by
economic ideology since its inception.”).
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one explain that inefficient antitrust rulings increased rather than decreased
in the 1950s and 1960s if in fact common law was efficient?222
Traditional theories of the efficiency of common law suggest just that—
the economic analysis should have led to more efficient outcomes.  Professor
Priest even claims that efficient rules will develop even when the judiciary
shows hostility to efficient outcomes.223  Certainly, antitrust jurisprudential
history does not bear this out.  Rather, the Supreme Court needed to act as a
centralizing authority to credit the importance—indeed, sole importance—
of some version of economic efficiency in antitrust common law (top-down
platform architecture) to affect change toward more efficient outcomes in
doctrines (bottom-up modular design) starting in the late 1970s.
3. Doctrinal Shift
The watershed case in antitrust that signaled the system-wide shift to
greater economic analysis was Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.224  In
Sylvania, the Court moved territorial nonprice restrictions from per se illegal-
ity to a rule-of-reason standard.225 Sylvania was a paradigm shift because of
the explicit language that economics should guide which standard to use.
The Court explained that:
Such [nonprice] restrictions, in varying forms, are widely used in our free
market economy.  As indicated above, there is substantial scholarly and judi-
cial authority supporting their economic utility. . . . [W]e do make clear that
departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstra-
ble economic effect rather than . . . formalistic line drawing.226
Posner correctly noted that the logic of Sylvania, if applied across all antitrust
vertical restraints, would be sweeping.227  As a positive matter, Posner was
correct—in nearly every substantive area, vertical restraints have been trans-
formed from per se illegality to one of rule of reason based on a presumption
that economic effects of potential efficiencies may outweigh anticompetitive
concerns.228  This included a number of particular doctrines, such as mini-
222 Indeed, Posner concedes that antitrust law was inefficient. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 301 (1985) (“But at another level the inclusion
of antitrust [as a common law field] may seem simply to demonstrate the fatuity of my
enterprise of associating federal common law with economic efficiency.”).
223 Priest, The Common Law Process, supra note 8, at 66.
224 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
225 See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of
Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733. 744–51 (2012).
226 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57–59.
227 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5–13 (1977).
228 D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of
Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1006, 1015–16 (2014).  As a normative
matter, Chicago school thinkers pushed for per se legality of vertical restraints.  Robert H.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75
YALE L.J. 373, 391 (1966); Posner, supra note 227, at 6.
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mum resale price maintenance,229 maximum resale price maintenance,230
and Robinson-Patman primary-231 and secondary-line cases.232
In Reiter, decided two years after Sylvania, the Court cemented its reli-
ance on efficiency as the basis for antitrust jurisprudence.233  It explained
that the congressional “floor debates . . . suggest that Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”234  Similarly, Board of
Regents discussed that “[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing the impor-
tance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent
with this fundamental goal of antitrust law.”235
Where the economic models and academic discourse have some amount
of consensus, the caselaw has moved in the direction of the economic con-
sensus for modular change to overturn established doctrines.236  Where
there remains some conflict as to the appropriate economic tests, such as in
discounts, antitrust has not created an effective approach that the Supreme
Court has recognized.237  Procedural rules likewise have changed in antitrust
to comport with a more economic-based approach such that the procedural
screens have been tightened to prevent many nonmeritorious cases from
being heard by judges on the substance.238
While these practices pose some anticompetitive risk (which would lead
to inefficient outcomes), the rule of reason opens up these general theories
to fact-specific inquiry in cases to address the potential benefits and harms of
certain conduct.  This allows for antitrust to evolve the substantive law in par-
ticular doctrines based upon new knowledge so that theory which aligns with
229 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885, 898, 907
(2007).
230 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997).
231 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220–22,
229–30 (1993).
232 See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 176–80
(2006).
233 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
234 Id. at 343 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
235 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (emphasis
added).
236 See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 221, at 58 (“Today, the links between economics
and law have been institutionalized with increasing presence of an economic perspective in
law schools, extensive and explicit judicial reliance on economic theory, and with the sub-
stantial presence of economists in the government antitrust agencies.”).
237 See Collins Inkjet Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 781 F.3d 264, 274 (6th Cir. 2015); ZF
Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 303 (3d Cir. 2012); Cascade Health Sols. v.
PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 177 (3d
Cir. 2003) (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
238 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–58 (2007); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–90 (1986); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo.,
Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
486–87 (1977); see also William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1271–94
(1989).
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the dominant intellectual system will be more likely to be accepted.239  This
approximates modular design based on a Linux-like open-source centralized
governance structure.
In practice, the singular goal of efficiency has dealt with questions of
equity in antitrust (such as income redistribution or job creation) since 1977
by explicitly not dealing directly with these issues.240  Sometimes there is
overlap in antitrust of this larger view of “macro efficiency,” but other times it
is in tension.  In the traditional case, equity can be served when antitrust
battles against price-fixing cartels such as for school milk, which is provided
to students from low-income families.241  In such a case, a price-fixing cartel
that illegally raises the price of milk above the competitive level also hurts
low-income consumers disproportionately.  However, one can imagine a situ-
ation in which the victims of the price fixing are wealthy, such as the price-
fixing cartel between Christie’s and Sotheby’s.242  In that case, the enforce-
ment against the cartel creates increased economic inequality by favoring the
wealthy.  Overall, an economic-based approach removed the political discre-
tion of multiple goals.243  Antitrust has expressly abandoned equity concerns
as part of its analysis for an application of economic analysis.
4. Academic Shift
Academic debates as to antitrust’s goals shaped the move in the courts to
a singular efficiency-based view.  The justification for the singular goal was
made on both economic grounds as well as legal process grounds in the aca-
demic literature.  This was the major contribution of Bork, who explained
that antitrust needed a clear goal.244  This goal was efficiency.
239 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (4th ed.
2012) (explaining paradigms and paradigm shifts).
240 See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 110, at 98–99 (3d
ed. 2006); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 717
(2018).
241 See Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of
Bidding, 30 RAND J. ECON. 263, 263 (1999).
242 See Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 775–76
(2009).
243 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703–04
(1986) (“Goals based on something other than efficiency (or its close proxy consumers’
welfare) really call on judges to redistribute income.”); see also Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy
and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2008).
244 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50 (2d ed. 1993). But see Louis Kaplow,
Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at
181, 182, 184–87 (arguing that the Supreme Court did not actively pursue a Chicago
school approach to antitrust in its actual jurisprudence in many cases even as it grappled
with the economics of its time).  There were a number of missed opportunities along the
way to overturn Dr. Miles.  This suggests that antitrust law was not efficient, even into the
early period of the singular goal period.  Sequencing of cases also mattered across doc-
trines with easier doctrines being overturned earlier. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733 (1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761,
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In a series of papers and a book, Bork argued that antitrust always had a
singular goal.245  In a 1966 article, Bork reviewed the legislative history of the
Sherman Act.  He made the case that economic efficiency (he called it “con-
sumer welfare,” though he seemed to have meant “total welfare”) was, since
the beginning of the Sherman Act, the sole guiding principle of antitrust.246
Bork’s reframing of antitrust to a consumer-welfare approach was not in
line with prior legislative history, cases, or scholarship, but Bork recast these
cases as fitting within his approach.247  Subsequent Supreme Court and lower
court cases have supported the framing of a “consumer welfare” approach,
and more recent cases support that “consumer welfare” actually seems to
mean consumer welfare rather than a total welfare standard.248
Perhaps more importantly, Bork explained that from the standpoint of
legal process and predictability, a singular economic-based goal would lead
to greater predictability and would help consumers.249  This singular eco-
nomic goal was embraced by many law-and-economics professors, beyond
what loosely can be described as the Chicago school.250
Professors Kovacic and Hovenkamp suggest that the shift was evolution-
ary and combined both Chicago and Harvard approaches.251  Chicago
769 (1984); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1926); United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306–08 (1919).
245 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7, 10 (1966).
246 See id.  Bork then argued that as a normative matter, efficiency should be the sole
goal. See Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 242, 242 (1967).
247 See Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 73, 75 (1985); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act
Re-examined, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 263, 273–74 (1992); Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to
the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS
188 (1st ed. 1965), as reprinted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS 20, 23–24 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991); Hovenkamp, supra note
209, at 29 (“The principal victims of the trust movement of the 1880s—certainly of the
trusts that appeared most frequently on Congress’ hit list—were inefficient small firms,
rather than consumers.  Competitors were the principal protected class of the Sherman
Act.”); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5 (1985).
248 See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312,
324 (2007); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 902 (2007).
249 BORK, supra note 244, at 66, 97 (arguing for a “consumer welfare” standard for
illegality, although equating this standard with “total welfare,” as that term is understood in
economics).
250 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2471, 2471 (2013) (“The dominant view of antitrust policy in the United States is that it
should promote some version of economic welfare.”); see also Dennis W. Carlton, Does Anti-
trust Need to Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 155, 157 (2007).
251 Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust
Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 617–18 (2010) (“Since the 1970s both the old Harvard
and the traditional Chicago positions have moved from opposite directions toward the
center, partly as a result of the influence of transaction cost analysis.  Today their differ-
ences on many issues are not all that considerable.”);William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual
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school scholars generally identified explanations of procompetitive behavior
where the prior characterization for this practice had been monopolistic.252
“Chicago school” has become a shorthand for economic analysis in antitrust
law even when the analysis was not based on what might be thought of as
actual Chicago school, but as a basis of a broader economic analysis.253
Harvard school antitrust brought greater administrability to the “Chicago”
enterprise.254  By administrability, one means the administrability of the legal
rules of antitrust by its institutions.255
This Article suggests that antitrust administrability created a greater
functionality to the system architecture by making it easier to switch out doc-
trinal modules that were less efficient for more efficient ones.  The over-
whelming academic literature has supported some form of efficiency as the
goal of antitrust since that time.256  Between courts and academic literature,
the singular efficiency goal of antitrust is not questioned.257
DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double
Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 35; see also Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance,
and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (“[Non-economic
goals] would broaden antitrust’s proscriptions to cover business conduct that has no signif-
icant anticompetitive effects, would increase vagueness in the law, and would discourage
conduct that promotes efficiencies not easily recognized or proved.”).
252 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19, 20 (1957); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L.
& ECON. 137, 168–69 (1958); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3
J.L. & ECON. 86, 88 (1960).
253 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
483, 512 n.109 (2006) (“Post-Chicago criticisms of current antitrust doctrine largely accept
the economic approach, and call for modifications to existing rules based upon the appli-
cation of game theoretic tools and new empirical economic methods.”); Malcolm B. Coate
& Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert?, 34 AKRON L. REV. 795,
813 (2001) (“[Post-Chicago school economic models] start with the Chicago school’s pro-
position that economics controls antitrust, but then they add complexity to the
microeconomic analysis that seeks to generate a collection of special case results.”); Rich-
ard A. Posner, Keynote Address: Vertical Restrictions and “Fragile” Monopoly, 50 ANTITRUST
BULL. 499, 500 (2005).
254 Chicago school antitrust was not unaware of administrability concerns.  Robert Bork
thought about such concerns in the context of Chicago antitrust. See Sokol, supra note
228, at 1007.
255 See Kovacic, supra note 251, at 12–14, 37–42.
256 See Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of
Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2181 (2013); Carlton, supra note 250, at 157; Kenneth
G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191 n.1 (1977); Hovenkamp, supra note 250, at 2471; Alan J. Meese,
Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us
a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 736 (2010).
257 By the second edition of his Antitrust Law casebook in 2001, Posner could accu-
rately claim:
Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today—whether as litigator,
prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed observer—not only agrees that the only
goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees
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This singular goal created an architectural governance shift not to
merely a singular goal, but to an entire system of an error-cost framework for
antitrust that provides the broader architecture that shapes the overall
design, changing each of the modules from per se analysis to the rule of
reason.258  Antitrust, once in the mode of consumer-welfare maximization,
has been evolutionary.259
In practice, antitrust’s welfare goal is “efficiency” based in a very narrow
sense.  It is a simplistic approximation of the optimization of output.260  That
is, often low prices act as a proxy for a competitive market, and so that behav-
ior tends to lead to lower prices long term.261  This approach has limits par-
ticularly for nonprice competition, where courts sometimes have struggled to
address quality competition,262 although nonprice competition has been a
hallmark of antitrust analysis for more than a century.263  However, in spite
of the weaknesses of the current approach, it is easier to administer than
alternative tests.264
5. Robinson-Patman
The Robinson-Patman Act provides the best example of how antitrust
court-based law has moved toward greater doctrinal efficiency.  There was no
goal other than inefficiency in the Act’s enabling legislation.  During the
modern era of an efficiency-goal-based antitrust, Robinson-Patman has been
on the essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine the
consistency of specific business practices with that goal.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at ix (2d ed. 2001).
258 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (1984);
David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A
Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 74–75, 75 n.8 (2005).
259 See Page, supra note 238, at 1221–22.
260 See Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 133, 141 (2010); see also A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law Is Not That Complicated,
130 HARV. L. REV. F. 163, 164–65 (2017) (explaining antitrust’s administrability).
261 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 909 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Sherman Act seeks to maintain a marketplace free of
anticompetitive practices . . . . The law assumes that such a marketplace . . . will tend to
bring about the lower prices, better products, and more efficient production processes that
consumers typically desire.”).  The emphasis on price as the basis (though not exclusive
basis) as the simplification for economic analysis in modern Supreme Court antitrust juris-
prudence can be traced back at least to National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
262 Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 1969, 1995 (2015).
263 See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44–45 (2006); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483–85 (1992); United States v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 150, 166–70 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v. Am. Can Co.,
230 F. 859, 901–04 (D. Md. 1916).
264 See Hovenkamp, supra note 250, at 2496 (“When one considers both efficiency and
administrability, consumer welfare emerges as the most practical goal of antitrust
enforcement.”).
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reformulated doctrinally over time to embrace efficiency, even as the law
itself has not been expressly overruled.
The origin of the Robinson-Patman Act265 was based on protection of
small retailers from larger, more efficient competitors (large buyers).266
Originally titled the “Wholesale Grocer’s Protection Act,”267 there were no
multiple purposes to the Act akin to the Sherman Act, such that one could
reasonably claim any sort of efficiency basis for Robinson-Patman.  As the
Supreme Court noted:
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear
that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a
competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer’s
quantity purchasing ability.  The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive
a large buyer of such advantages . . . .268
From an economic standpoint, much price discrimination is in practice a
good thing—e.g., different pricing for matinee versus evening showings of
movies or discounts for senior citizens.  The types of economic concerns
regarding price discrimination therefore are different than the purpose of
Robinson-Patman.269
Robinson-Patman prevents price differences of “commodities of like
grade and quality.”270  The Act creates two particular areas of antitrust liabil-
ity—primary- and secondary-line price discrimination.  In the case of a pri-
mary-line injury, the economic “injury” results from competitor sellers
harmed as a result of the price-discrimination discount offered by a seller.271
In the case of a secondary-line injury, the “injury” results to disfavored cus-
tomers of the seller, relative to customers that the seller favors.272  Unlike the
Sherman Act, Robinson-Patman does not require that the defendant hold
market power for there to be an injury.  As a result, small competitors can
bring cases against other small competitors.
Once the shift to economic analysis came about in the 1970s, efficiency
in the common law of Robinson-Patman liability was perhaps inevitable.
After all, there had been near uniform academic and practitioner discontent
265 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13b, 21a (2012).
266 Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, The Robinson-Patman Act: A Look Backwards, a
View Forward, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 571–72 (1986); D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-
Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2064, 2069 (2015).
267 Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm,
62 U. PITT. L. REV. 535, 542 n.39 (2001).
268 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948).
269 Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,
598, 646 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
270 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
271 See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 176 (2006)
(“Primary-line cases entail conduct—most conspicuously, predatory pricing—that injures
competition at the level of the discriminating seller and its direct competitors.”).
272 See id. (“Secondary-line cases . . . involve price discrimination that injures competi-
tion among the discriminating seller’s customers . . . ; cases in this category typically refer
to ‘favored’ and ‘disfavored’ purchasers.”).
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with how the Act, which did not require a showing of market power, hurt
consumers.  This included criticism and evaluation by high-profile practi-
tioner reports such as the 1955 report on antitrust,273 the 1968 “Neal
Report,”274 the Department of Justice report of 1977,275 and the American
Bar Association report of 1980.276
Academic discourse was just as critical of Robinson-Patman and led to its
demise in the courts.  Indeed, Bork referred to Robinson-Patman as “the mis-
shapen progeny of intolerable draftsmanship coupled to wholly mistaken
economic theory.”277  Robinson-Patman was so uneconomic at its core that
Bork described it as “antitrust’s least glorious hour.”278  Other scholars have
attacked the Act for hurting consumers.279
The Supreme Court began a shift in its approach in 1979 by reasoning
that the Robinson-Patman Act was based on the same efficiency considera-
tion as the Sherman Act.280  Similarly, with regard to antitrust injury, the
Court applied the same reasoning as it did to the Sherman Act.  These deci-
sions had the effect of narrowing the number and types of cases that would
find a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.281
The major change in substantive primary-line Robinson-Patman cases
was the Court’s opinion in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.282  In Brooke Group, the Court required that a plaintiff must demon-
strate that the price discrimination was below some economic measurement
of the cost of its production and that the defendant was able, or was likely
able, to recoup the losses.283  Meeting this test has proved to be nearly impos-
sible for plaintiffs.  Thus, the Supreme Court effectively killed off Robinson-
Patman primary-line cases.284
273 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 131 (1955).
274 Phil C. Neal et al., Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, ANTITRUST L.
& ECON. REV., Winter 1968–69, at 11, 13.
275 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 37–100 (1977).
276 1 SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY
AND LAW (1980).
277 BORK, supra note 244, at 382.
278 Id.
279 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 41, 49 (1976); Kenneth G.
Elzinga & Thomas F Hogarty, Utah Pie and the Consequences of Robinson-Patman, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 427 (1978) (higher cost to business ultimately gets passed on to consumers in the
form of higher price); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition:
Unfinished Business, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 129–30 (2000).
280 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13 (1979) (“[T]he Robinson-
Patman Act should be construed consistently with broader policies of the antitrust laws.”).
281 See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981).
282 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
283 Id. at 222–24.
284 Sokol, supra note 266, at 2094.
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6. Antitrust as Common-Law Efficient Modular Open-Source Platform
Antitrust did not become more predictable in a way that, from an eco-
nomic perspective, improved outcomes based on an efficiency framework
merely because it was part of a legal platform.  Rather, antitrust became more
efficient, and other fields of law did not.  Antitrust figured out the right
formula for success—design rules and a platform architecture that allowed
for a singular goal to develop and to replace doctrines that did not fit within
these design rules one at a time through modularity that did not suffer from
fragmentation.
Robinson-Patman cases and scholarship reflect this transformation even
in the case where the underlying statute was entirely inefficient.  Over time,
cases shifted to more efficient outcomes as caselaw changed to reflect eco-
nomic thinking based on a Supreme Court that had a singular goal of effi-
ciency that explicitly read in efficiency arguments, even when not required to
do so.285
CONCLUSION
This Article explains the limits of the traditional approach to the effi-
ciency-of-common-law hypothesis.  It also reframes where such efficiency is
possible as a two-sided open-source modular platform.  It is under this frame-
work that antitrust stands out across areas of law as the one area of doctrine
in which the efficiency of common law occurred.  This unique outcome was a
result of antitrust’s singular economic-based goal (based on federal law)
working in tandem with (more or less) academic consensus that the singular
goal should serve as the basis for antitrust law across antitrust’s various
doctrines.
For law to become more efficient in other substantive areas of judge-
made law, courts must recognize a singular economic goal where the eco-
nomics are not in dispute and where there is no legislative pushback to a
singular economic-based goal.  Traditional state-level common-law subjects
are not ripe for a transformation based on the efficiency of common law
because of fragmentation and multiple goals.  Certain other areas of federal
regulation are potentially ripe for a shift to an efficiency-of-common-law
approach, but the Supreme Court has to be careful in pushing back against
doctrines that it expressly overturns, rather than limits, because of legislative
or administrative pushback.
Whether or not economic analysis should be the normative basis for all
of common law is beyond the scope for this Article.  However, as a framing
mechanism, understanding the two-sided nature of legal markets—that is
open source and modular—explains why judge-made law as a positive matter
285 See Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectiv-
ity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 377–83 (1994) (providing a backstory on Brooke Group);
see generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Antitrust Predation and The Antitrust Para-
dox, 57 J.L. & ECON. S181 (providing context of the economic arguments made before the
Supreme Court).
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has not become more efficient over time in nearly every field.  It also helps to
explain why efficiency of the common law has not been uniform across differ-
ent common-law systems around the world, as well as the differences that
occur across countries and substantive areas of law.
